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Abstract:   
Trope ontology is exposed and confronted with the question where one trope 
ends and another begins.  It is argued that tropes do not have determinate 
boundaries, it is arbitrary how tropes are carved up.  An ontology, which I call 
field ontology, is proposed which takes this into account.  The material world 
consists of a certain number of fields, each of which is extended over all of 
space.  It is shown how field ontology can also tackle the problem of determin-




Socrates said to Phaedrus that it would be good if one were able to carve 
up everything at its natural joints. (Plato, Phaedrus 265e)  One should 
not carve up things like a bad cook who destroys the limbs when he 
carves up the beast because he does not carve it at its natural joints.  The 
philosophical question here is how the material world is to be divided up 
into particulars.  Which portions of reality are really particulars?  Is the 
mereological sum of a table plus a book that is lying on the table really a 
particular?  Or isn't it rather the case that the book is a particular, the 
table is a particular, but the sum of the table plus the book is not really a 
particular?  The question is whether there is one true way of dividing 
reality, or whether there are several ways of dividing reality which are 
equally adequate, or whether any way of dividing reality is as adequate 
as any other.   
This question about how to divide reality not only concerns concrete 
entities such as books and tables, but also abstract entities, i.e. ontically 
incomplete entities, such as the individual density of this table and the 
individual density of this book.  In contemporary ontology individual 
properties, such as the individual density of this table, are commonly 
called tropes.  In a trope ontology the question arises how tropes are to 
be divided up into particular tropes.  Where does one trope end and an-
other begin?  Where does, for example, the density of the book end and 
the density of the table begin?  Where is the boundary between the den-
sity trope of the book and the density trope of the table?  In this essay I 
shall argue that tropes do not have definite and nonarbitrary bounda-
ries.  This will take me to an ontology in which the basic entities are 
edgeless and extended over all of space – I call these entities "fields".   
To start with, I shall expound a version of trope ontology which I con-
sider to be the strongest.  I shall then confront this ontology with the 
question how tropes are to be divided up into particular tropes and 
whether tropes have definite and nonarbitrary boundaries.  I shall con-
clude that tropes do not have such boundaries and that we should there-
fore rethink trope ontology.  Field ontology, which I shall propose as an 
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ontology which does justice to the fact that tropes do not have definite 
boundaries, is a promising model of the ontic structures of the physical 
world.  I shall try to develop field ontology in some detail and show how 
it can tackle some central problems of ontology such as the problem of 
determinable properties and a problem which I call the problem of com-
pleteness of things.   
Trope ontology 
The fact that two things can have the same property made many phi-
losophers believe that properties are universals, i.e. entities which can be 
instantiated by several particular things.  According to this view, which 
is called realism, a thing has a certain property by instantiating a certain 
universal.  It is assumed that particulars and universals are entities of 
two different categories, and that a usual thing, e.g. a particular stone, is 
a particular which stands in the relation of instantiation to certain uni-
versals. (Though it is sometimes denied that instantiation is really a rela-
tion (cf. Armstrong 1978, p. 108)).  An apple which has the density 1,5 
g/cm3 has this density because it stands in the relation of instantiation to 
the universal which we may call "being 1,5 g/cm3".  A certain pear may 
have the same density, and in this case the pear instantiates the universal 
of being 1,5 g/cm3 too.  Two things have a property in common if they 
instantiate the same universal.1   
I have argued elsewhere2 that an ontology with universals faces several 
serious difficulties and that we should better look for an ontology with-
                                                           
1 In recent years this ontology has been developed in detail and defended by David 
Armstrong; see his 1978, 1989 and 1997.  See also Fales 1990, Bigelow & Pargetter 1990, 
Lowe 1994, and Smith 1997.  For an up to date introduction to the current debate about 
properties see Oliver 1996.  
2 See my Dinge und Eigenschaften, forthcoming.  See also Campbell 1990, pp. 6-17.   
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out universals.  Realism has a strong rival: trope ontology, according to 
which properties are particulars which may resemble each other.  Trope 
ontology has been developed and defended in the Anglo-Saxon tradition 
by, for example, Donald Williams (1953), Keith Campbell (1990), Peter 
Simons (1994), John Bacon (1995), D.W. Mertz (1996), and Arda Den-
kel (1996).  David Armstrong, though he prefers realism to trope ontol-
ogy, gave the trope ontology a great boost by recognising the strengths 
of this ontology in his Universals: An Opinionated Introduction (1989, 
ch. 6).  However, tropes are by no means a discovery of Anglo-Saxon 
philosophy.  Edmund Husserl held an ontology with tropes, which he 
called "moments", and Roman Ingarden developed a trope ontology in 
detail in his mammoth treatise The Controversy About the Existence of 
the World, published 1947 in Polish, especially in vol. II/1 (1965).  Aris-
totle and most medieval philosophers also held the existence of tropes.  I 
refrain from discussing here the various versions of realism and the 
various versions of trope ontology.  Instead, I shall outline how trope 
ontology is best construed in my view.  I shall restrict my considerations 
here to material entities, i.e. to non-living, extended entities, which are 
in space and time, have mass, density etc., such as stones, apples or stars.  
My reason for this is that I do not want to presuppose that organisms3, 
persons, God or numbers have the same ontic structure as non-living 
material entities.   
Why do we say that things have properties?  Why do we distinguish be-
tween things and their properties?  Things are complex.  We can not 
only distinguish between spatial parts of a thing, e.g. the egg yolk and 
the egg white of a particular egg, but also between aspects, between 
properties of a thing, such as the mass and the charge of a particular 
stone.  Using Edmund Husserl's (III. Logical Investigation, §17) and 
                                                           
3 Peter van Inwagen (1990, Material Beings, Ithaca: Cornell UP) for example holds 
that organisms have a different ontic status than e.g. tables.  He even claims that "there 
are no tables or chairs or any other visible objects except living organisms". (1990, p. 1)  
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Donald Williams' (1953, p. 6 and 1986, p. 3) terminology we may call 
the former kind of parts concrete parts of a thing and the latter kind of 
parts, the properties, abstract parts of a thing.  Assume that a certain 
thing T is at a region R such that no part of T is not within R and that 
nothing in R is not a part of T.  R is the position of T, T occupies R, and 
T is the whole content of R.  A concrete part of T then is a thing which is 
the whole content of a certain subregion R' of R.  If a particular egg is at 
the spatial region R then the egg yolk of the egg is a concrete part of it 
because it is the whole content of the region R', where R' is the region at 
which the egg yoke is and R' is a subregion of R.   
We can say that an entity is concrete if it is the whole content of a cer-
tain spatial region.  An entity is abstract if it is not the whole content of 
the spatial region it occupies.  P is an abstract part of the concrete entity 
T if P is an abstract entity and P is contained by the same region as T.  
The egg yolk of an egg is a concrete entity and it is a concrete part of the 
egg.  The density of the egg is an abstract entity and it is an abstract part 
of the egg.  Tropes are properties of a thing conceived of as abstract parts 
of the thing and as particulars.  The tropes of a thing are as much a par-
ticular (as opposed to being a universal) as the thing is a particular.  Dif-
ferent tropes of a thing exist in the same region together, they coexist or, 
to use Russell's term, they are compresent.   
But why do we and how can we distinguish between different properties, 
tropes, of a thing?  The reason for this is that different properties bestow 
different causal powers upon the thing.  Due to its mass the moon is at-
tracted by the sun (by gravitational force), whereas the temperature of 
the moon, for example, is irrelevant for the gravitational force between 
the moon and the sun.  It is the heat of the hot-plate which makes the 
water boiling, whereas the mass or the charge of the hot-plate is irrele-
vant for this.  Certain properties of a thing make it that the thing has 
certain effects upon our senses and let it behave in certain ways in cer-
tain experiments.  We can distinguish between different properties of a 
thing by distinguishing between different causal powers the thing has.   
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I introduced the notion of an abstract entity as something which is not 
the whole content of the region it occupies, and I said that tropes are 
abstract entities.  Williams and Campbell, however, hold that a trope of 
a thing could as well exist without the other tropes of the thing.  The 
density trope and the temperature trope of a stone, for example, as a 
matter of fact coexist, but they could as well exist without each other, 
every trope could exist isolated.  Campbell (1990, p. 21) writes: "We can 
take the tropes to be the basic primary items.  It is a matter of fact, and 
not of metaphysical necessity, that tropes commonly occur in compre-
sent groups."  He allows explicitly for isolated tropes: "In trope theory, 
individual, isolated tropes, compresent with nothing, are admitted as 
possibilities." (1990, p. 59)  If one holds this view one cannot character-
ise tropes as abstract entities as I introduced the notion of an abstract 
entity.  Williams and Campbell give a slightly different meaning to the 
term 'astract'.  They hold that an abstract entity is an entity for which it 
is possible – but not necessary, as I said – that there is another entity at 
the very same position.  According to Williams and Campbell, abstract 
entities are entities of which there can be more than one at the same 
place and time.4  With this terminology they can still call their tropes 
abstract although they believe that tropes can be the whole content of a 
certain region.   
However, I do not believe that there can be isolated, lonely tropes.  
Could the density of a stone exist without the other properties of the 
stone?  Can there be a density without being together with some mass 
                                                           
4 This usage of the word 'abstract' can be found in Williams 1986, p. 3 (cf. his 1956, p. 
5 and pp.14f), Armstrong 1978a, 121f, and Campbell 1990, p. 3.  Williams, however, uses 
'abstract' sometimes ambiguously.  On the one hand he writes "abstract entities differ 
from concreta in that many of them can and do occupy the same plime" (1986, p. 3) – I 
take it that this means that it is only essential for an abstract entity in this sense that they 
can occupy the same plime as another entity –, but on the other hand he says that a con-
crete entity is one which "exhausts or is the whole content" of a certain space-time re-
gion.  His terminology would be more coherent if he said that a concrete entity is an 
entity which cannot be at the same position as another entity.   
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and some temperature?  Could it happen that we find on some planet 
something which is a naked density trope, not coexisting with a tem-
perature trope and many more tropes?  I do not know how to argue that 
this is impossible, but I suggest that we should rely on our modal intui-
tions in this case.  I can think of no better examples of impossibilities 
than the impossibility of there being an isolated trope.  We refer to a 
single trope and we come to recognise a single trope only by an act of 
abstraction.  When we observe a thing we can draw our attention to a 
certain aspect of the thing by leaving aside other aspects of the thing.  
But we always observe complete things consisting of many tropes, we 
never observe isolated tropes.  I suggest that before we have not ob-
served an isolated trope we should not assume that there could be iso-
lated tropes.5   
To say that a trope could not exist alone without the other tropes is to 
say that it is in its existence in a certain sense dependent on the other 
tropes of the thing of which it is a trope.  Roman Ingarden calls the kind 
of existential dependence in question "existential non-self-sufficiency"6 
("Seinsunselbständigkeit") (cf. Ingarden 1964, § 14).  An entity x is non-
self-sufficient upon an entity y if x cannot exist except by coexisting with 
y in a single whole (i.e. a complete thing) or coexisting with another en-
tity z, which is a member of a certain class of entities which includes y.  
We can explicate the notion of a "single whole" ("Einheit eines Ganzen") 
by stating that entities exist in a single whole when they occupy the same 
region of space (at the same time).  The density trope of a certain stone 
for example is non-self-sufficient upon the temperature trope of that 
stone because it cannot exist without a temperature trope, i.e. without a 
trope of the class of temperature tropes, of which the temperature trope 
                                                           
5 This position is, contra Williams and Campbell, also held by Simons (1994, p. 559) 
and Denkel (1996, p. 16f).   
6 This translation is suggested by Peter Simons (1982, "The Formalisation of Husserl's 
Theory of Wholes and Parts", Parts and Moments, ed. Barry Smith, Munich: Philoso-
phia, p. 135).  
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the stone actually has is a member.  Ingarden says in this case, where the 
density trope requires some temperature trope but not a particular one, 
that the density trope is ambiguously non-self-sufficient upon the tem-
perature trope.   
My view that tropes are non-self-sufficient has a further advantage, be-
cause the non-self-sufficiency of tropes explains what binds tropes 
which constitute a thing together.  Michael LaBossiere (1994) for exam-
ple has argued that a bundle-of-tropes view, according to which a thing 
is nothing but a bundle of compresent tropes, cannot explain what binds 
tropes together, and therefore one should accept a trope-substrata view, 
according to which tropes are borne by substrata.  If things were bundles 
of tropes, he argues, there would have to be binding tropes which serve 
to bind the tropes of a thing together.  But then the question would arise 
what binds the binding tropes, because if the tropes of a thing need to be 
bound together and if binding tropes are tropes then the binding tropes 
must also be bound.  He concludes that one should prefer a trope-
substrata view, where substrata, which unlike tropes need not to be 
bound, serve to bind the tropes of a thing.  But if the tropes of a thing 
are non-self-sufficient upon each other – as for example in Roman In-
garden's ontology – this solves the problem of binding tropes.  The 
tropes of a thing are held together by their mutual existential depend-
ence upon each other – no extra binding entity is required.   
There are two facts about things of which an ontology has to give an ac-
count: First, things have various aspects, i.e. things have properties.  Sec-
ondly, two things can have the same property.  Trope ontology does jus-
tice to the fact that things have various properties by assuming, as de-
scribed, that a thing consists of many tropes.  But how does trope ontol-
ogy explain how two things can have the same property?  The answer is 
that tropes can resemble each other in degrees between no resemblance 
and exact resemblance.  Resemblance between tropes is not to be ana-
lysed in terms of having some entity in common.  Resemblance is not 
analysable.  If a particular apple and a particular pear both have the mass 
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0,5 kg, then it is true to say that they have the same mass because the 
mass trope of the apple and the mass trope of the pear resemble each 
other exactly.  The mass trope of that apple resembles the mass trope of 
that pear to a maximal degree, and it resembles it to a higher degree than 
it resembles the mass trope of a pear with the mass 0,4 kg.  All mass 
tropes resemble each other to a higher or lesser degree.  This is how they 
are ordered and why they form a continuous spectrum, such that we can 
attribute numerical values to them.   
Note that it is primarily tropes that resemble each other.  Whole things – 
concrete entities – resemble each other only if tropes of them resemble 
each other.  This is important because otherwise the problem of co-
extension and the problem of imperfect community would arise which 
both arise for a more deflationary resemblance theory which tries to 
deny properties at all and which claims that for a thing to have a certain 
property is for it just to belong to a certain class of things which resem-
ble each other.  Such classes are called similarity circles.7  The problem 
of coextension arises because the similarity circles of two properties can 
be identical.  All animals with a heart have a kidney and all animals with 
a kidney have a heart, hence the similarity circles for 'having a heart' and 
'having a kidney' are identical – although certainly the properties of 'hav-
ing a heart' and of 'having a kidney' are two different properties.  If hav-
ing a certain property for a thing were nothing but for it to belong to a 
certain similarity circle, then the properties of 'having a heart' and of 
'having a kidney' would be identical.  But they are not, therefore for a 
thing to have a certain property does not just consist in its belonging to a 
certain similarity circle.  This problem does not arise for trope ontology 
because the having-a-heart tropes – let us assume only for the sake of 
the argument that there are such tropes – form one similarity circle and 
                                                           
7 Rudolf Carnap, in Der Logische Aufbau der Welt (1927), tried to construct properties 
as similarity circles of particulars.  Cf. Campbell 1990, p. 33 on the problem of coexten-
sion and the problem of imperfect community.   
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the having-a-kidney tropes form another similarity circle.  The having-
a-heart tropes are distinct from the having-a-kidney tropes, and none of 
the former resembles one of the latter.   
The problem of imperfect community may be demonstrated by the fol-
lowing example.  A leaf resembles a greenfinch, and the greenfinch re-
sembles a sparrow.  These three things, together with many other things, 
form a similarity circle.  But there is not a single property which corre-
sponds to this similarity circle.  This problem arises because things are 
complex and resemble each other in various aspects.  It does not arise 
for trope ontology because according to trope ontology it is the colour 
trope of the leaf and the colour trope of the greenfinch that resemble 
each other, and it is the being-a-bird trope of the greenfinch and the be-
ing-a-bird trope of the sparrow that resemble each other.  Certainly, the 
colour trope of the leaf does not resemble the being-a-bird trope of the 
sparrow.  The problem of imperfect community does not arise for trope 
ontology because trope ontology does justice to the fact that things are 
complex, i.e. that things have many aspects.   
I should point out that this account of resemblance between things has a 
remarkable advantage over the account that is given by realism.  The fact 
that two things can have the same property is explained by realism by 
the assumption that there are entities, universals, which are such that 
they can be instantiated by more than one thing.  The difficulty with re-
alism now is that this explanation can only be applied for cases where 
things have exactly the same property, but it fails for cases where things 
have not exactly the same property but they have similar properties.  An 
apple with the mass 0,31 kg has not the same mass as a pear with the 
mass 0,32 kg but still the apple and the pear resemble each other in their 
mass.  This resemblance cannot be explained in terms of two things in-
stantiating the same property.  So what account can the realist give?  It 
seems as though he also has to appeal to some primitive resemblance, in 
this case primitive resemblance between universals.  But if we have to 
accept primitive resemblance anyway, why not explain all resemblance 
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in terms of primitive resemblance?  For a trope theory with primitive 
resemblance as I proposed it resemblance between things with exactly 
the same mass and resemblance between things with similar mass is 
both to be explained in terms of primitive resemblance between tropes.   
To summarise, I think trope ontology is best construed as follows: 
Things, such as stones or eggs, are complexes of tropes, i.e. of individual 
property instances.  The tropes of a thing are non-self-sufficient upon 
each other, i.e. a single trope could not exist but needs to coexist with 
other tropes, together with which it constitutes a concrete thing.  Tropes 
resemble each other more or less closely.  This resemblance is unana-
lysable.  Concrete things resemble each other if tropes of these things 
resemble each other.   
The problem of the boundaries of tropes 
Having given an outline of how trope ontology is best construed I now 
want to turn to the question how the material world is to be divided up 
into particulars.  More exactly, I want to investigate how tropes are to 
divided up into particular tropes.  This question arises for trope ontol-
ogy because tropes are supposed to be spatial entities, and they are sup-
posed to have boundaries.  Assume there is a pot with water and there is 
an egg in the water.  Which temperature tropes are there in the pot?  We 
would like to say that there is the temperature trope of the egg.  There is 
probably also the temperature trope of the water.  If we accept that there 
are these two tropes we may ask: Where is the boundary between these 
two tropes?  What is the boundary of the temperature trope of the egg?  
Where does one trope end and where does another trope begin?  Is there 
one true way of dividing up tropes?  Do tropes have definite boundaries?  
Do the boundaries of tropes coincide with the boundaries we ascribe to 
concrete objects, such as eggs and stones?  These are questions, I think, 
trope ontology should be able to answer.  In what follows I shall first 
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mention two answers to these questions that claim that tropes do have 
definite boundaries and that it is not arbitrary how tropes are carved up.  
However, I will not accept these answers.  After considering these an-
swers I shall present a theory according to which it is arbitrary how 
tropes are carved up.  I will call that theory "field theory".  Finally, I will 
argue that this theory can tackle the problem of determinable properties 
and the problem of completeness of objects.  
The first theory that I want to consider that claims that tropes have de-
terminate boundaries is trope-substance ontology.  According to such an 
ontology, which is a rival to the trope ontology which I proposed above, 
every genuine thing has a substance, an essential kernel, an essential nu-
cleus.  This is supposed to be something like the ontic centre of the 
thing, and it is that, which is the bearer of the tropes.  Roman Ingarden 
calls it the "constitutive nature" of the object.  Arda Denkel calls it the 
"particular essential nature".  If one accepts such a bearer of tropes one 
can claim that it determines the boundaries of the tropes.  According to 
this view, a trope has its boundary where the substance has its boundary.  
The substance bestows its boundary upon the trope.  In our case of an 
egg in a pot with water that means that the boundary of the temperature 
trope of the egg is identical with the boundary of the substance of the 
egg.  However, although I cannot argue the case here8 I shall assume that 
trope-substance ontology is false and that a physical object does not 
have an essential kernel.  Here I mention only that in trope-substance 
ontology the problem is only postponed.  The question where the 
boundaries of tropes are is answered, but then the question arises where 
the boundaries of substances are.   
The second theory that I want to consider that claims that tropes have 
determinate boundaries is to be expounded as follows.  Let us assume 
that the temperature of the egg is 21°C and the temperature of the water 
                                                           
8 For arguments against substance ontology see my Dinge und Eigenschaften, forth-
coming.  
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is 22°C.  The egg and the water have different determinate tropes of the 
same determinable property.  The determinable is temperature, and the 
different determinates are 21 or 22°C respectively.  The temperature 
trope of the egg and the temperature trope of the water are two tropes, 
according to this view, because they are different determinates.  One 
may assume that one determinate trope a ends where a determinate 
trope b begins which is incompatible with a because a and b belong to 
the same determinable but a is a different determinate from b.  The 
boundaries of a trope of the type '21°C' are where tropes of other tem-
peratures, for example 22°C, begin.  Let us call this view the theory of 
determinate tropes.   
According to this view the boundaries of tropes will not always coincide 
with the boundaries we ascribe to concrete objects such as eggs.  If, for 
example, in our pot the egg as well as the water had the temperature 
21°C, there would be, according to this theory, just one temperature 
trope for the two concrete objects, the egg and the water.  If, on the other 
hand, the egg yolk had the temperature 22°C, and the egg white as well 
as the water had the temperature 21°C, then there would be two tem-
perature tropes in the pot, but the boundary between the two tropes 
would not coincide with the boundary between the two concrete objects 
as we usually conceive of them, i.e. between the egg and the water.   
According to this view the physical world consists of tropes, each of 
which is extended in a certain region of space.  They may overlap each 
other, may be disjoint, or one may be ingredient of another.  A determi-
nate trope has a boundary where a trope of another determinate of the 
same determinable begins.  The surface of a concrete object would be 
where boundaries of several tropes coincide, but there would also be 
tropes which overlap the concrete object.   
The biggest problem for this account is that apparently there are not 
such sharp discontinuities between tropes.  If the egg has 21°C and the 
water has 22°C then it will not be the case that the discontinuity of the 
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temperatures determines a boundary between the two regions.  Rather, 
there will be a continuous transition from the region with 21°C to the 
region with 22°C.  Here it is true what Leibniz said: "Natura non facit 
saltus" – nature does not make leaps.  But if transitions between regions 
with different determinates of the same determinable are continuous, 
then the difference of the determinates cannot determine definite 
boundaries between tropes.  Hence the theory of determinate tropes is 
false.   
There is a phenomenon about material entities, of which we may expect 
an ontology to give an account, which I want to call the completeness of 
material entities.9  I have argued already above that an isolated trope 
cannot exist.  A single density trope for example cannot exist.  But which 
tropes needs a density trope to be combined with so that this complex of 
tropes can exist?  There are certain limitations as to what combination of 
properties a concrete entity can have.  Not every combination of proper-
ties, of tropes, can exist, only some sets of tropes can coexist and consti-
tute a thing.  For example, an object having all the properties of a par-
ticular egg except, for example, temperature cannot exist.  An existing 
extended object cannot lack, for example, charge or density.  Without 
density or charge it would be ontically incomplete.  Only ontically com-
plete objects can exist.   
It seems as though every concrete material entity has one determinate 
property for each of a certain set of determinables.  Every concrete entity 
is in this sense complete.  Every concrete material object has a density, a 
charge, a mass etc.  However, the theory of determinate tropes seems to 
allow for any combination of tropes in a given place.  It leaves at least 
unexplained why a concrete material object may not fail to have, e.g., a 
charge or a density.   
How many temperature tropes are there now in the pot with the water 
and the egg?  I have argued that the distribution of temperature in the 
                                                           
9 See Ingarden 1965, p. 67 and Campbell 1990, p. 153 about completeness of an object.  
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pot does not determine how many temperature tropes there are.  The 
transitions between regions with different temperatures are probably 
continuous, and therefore we cannot find out how the temperature in 
the pot is to be carved up just by measuring the temperature in the dif-
ferent regions.  As the search for objective determinate boundaries of 
tropes is unsuccessful we may assume that there are no such boundaries.  
From an ontological point of view it is arbitrary how tropes are carved 
up.  One may conceive of the temperature of the egg as one trope, but 
one may also conceive of the temperature of the egg yolk as one trope 
and of the temperature of the egg-white as another trope.  There is not 
ontologically privileged way of carving up tropes, because there are no 
objective boundaries of tropes to be discovered.  It is up to our choice 
how we divide the temperature in the pot up.  There are infinitely many 
possibilities how to divide up tropes and we can do it according to our 
interests.  If we want to say something about the egg compared to the 
water we can speak about the temperature of the egg as compared to the 
temperature of the water, even if the egg and the water have exactly the 
same temperature.  But this does not mean that there is a determinate 
boundary between the temperature trope of the egg and the temperature 
trope of the water which would determine that the temperature tropes in 
the pot are to be counted in one way rather than in some other way.  We 
can refer to the temperature in any region, and any region of tempera-
ture is equally legitimately to be conceived of as a temperature trope.   
Jonathan Lowe argues that an objection against trope ontology can be 
made out of this.  He thinks that if something is really to be an object in 
the strict sense then it must be an entity possessing determinate identity 
conditions.  In our example this would mean that there must be a "fact 
of the matter" as to whether or not the temperature trope of the water is 
identical with the temperature trope of the egg, and it must be an objec-
tive fact which is the right way of dividing up of tropes.   
[An object's individual] color, say, is not "itself" an object, somehow related to 
the object of which it is the color.  If it were an object, it would have determi-
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nate identity conditions, and yet it does not appear that it can have these.  Sup-
posing the colored object to be uniformly colored, it makes doubtful sense to 
ask whether "the color" of its top half is numerically identical with "the color" of 
its bottom half, or whether either or both of these is identical with "the color" of 
the whole object.  Certainly, these questions cannot apparently be answered in a 
nonarbitrary and principled way.  (Lowe 1995, 512f) 
I agree with Lowe that carving up tropes cannot be done in a nonarbi-
trary and principled way.  But I deny that therefore tropes may not 
properly be called "objects".  If one wants to one can conceive of the 
color of the top half of an apple and the color of the bottom half of the 
apple as two different tropes.  In this case it does make sense to ask 
whether the former is numerically identical with the latter.  The answer 
is that they are not numerically identical, they don't even overlap.   
Lowe's claim that objects must have determinate identity conditions 
probably entails that objects must have determinate boundaries and that 
it must be determinate how they are to be counted.  There must be a true 
answer to the question how many temperature tropes there are in the 
pot with the water and the egg.  Lowe would be right if there were enti-
ties with determinate identity conditions and determinate boundaries.  
If there were such entities it would be appropriate to take them to be ob-
jects in the strict sense, whereas tropes, which do not have determinate 
identity conditions, should be taken to be only objects in the loose sense.  
But it is likely that the carving up of all material entities is an arbitrary 
matter.   
Fields 
If this is true, if tropes do not have definite boundaries we should per-
haps rethink our trope-ontology.  According to a standard trope ontol-
ogy a concrete entity, such as an egg, is a bundle of tropes, such as a 
temperature, a density, a charge, etc.  According to this view the material 
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world is the totality of all these single tropes.  But if, as I have suggested, 
these tropes do not have definite boundaries, then that suggests that they 
are carved out of something.  And that is what I want to propose now: I 
want to propose an ontology with entities, of which Common Sense 
tropes, such as the temperature trope of an egg, are subdivisions.  Such 
an approach has been proposed by Keith Campbell (1990, ch. 6), and 
what I present now will be to a great extent along the lines of his theory.   
I do not deny that there are entities such as the temperature trope of an 
egg, but I think such entities are not the most basic material entities.  
Such middle-sized every day tropes are not "the primary constituents of 
this or any possible word, the very alphabet of being" (Williams 1953, p 
7) as Donald Williams thinks.  I suggest that the basic entities of the ma-
terial world are unbounded and are such that it is arbitrary how they are 
carved up.  They are unbounded in the same way as space is unbounded.  
For such an entity there is no area of which it is objectively – and not 
just depending on someone's decision – true that all points on the one 
side of that area are within the entity and all points on the other side of 
that area are not within the entity.  Furthermore, any portion (i.e. spatial 
subdivision) of such an entity is equally legitimately to be conceived of 
as an object as any other.  I call these basic entities fields.  A field is ex-
tended over all of space.  There may be more than one field.  I say then 
that the fields are superimposed.  The physical world consists of a certain 
number of superimposed fields, each of which is extended over total 
space.   
A field can have different intensities (or "strenghts") in different regions.  
That means that there are variations of a field, and a field may be in dif-
ferent regions in different variations.  Different regions of a field are 
more or less similar in intensity, in case of maximal similarity they have 
exactly the same intensity.  A field may be present in different regions in 
varying strengths.  I quote Keith Campbell's description of fields: 
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Taking our clue from space-time itself, we now propose that all the basic tropes 
are partless and edgeless in the ways that space is, and that they change only in 
space-time's innocent way.  All basic tropes are space-filling fields, each one of 
them distributes some quantity, in perhaps varying intensities, across all of 
space-time.  (Campbell 1990, p. 146) 
Now, the assumption that fields have different intensities in different 
regions allows us to conceive of a particle, e.g. a lepton or a boson, as "a 
zone in which several fields all sharply increase their intensity".  As mac-
roscopic objects are composed of elementary particles, and particles are 
regions of high field intensity, we may say that things are certain con-
figurations of field strengths in a certain region.   
Everywhere in space there are the same fields present.  Fields do not 
have holes, only regions of low intensity.  The world is not the sum of 
things between which there is nothing.  There is – as far as we know – 
no empty space.  It is recognised in physics that in regions of space 
which were thought to be empty there is so-called interstellar matter.   
Which fields are there?  It is a task of physics to discover which fields 
there actually are, but we may speculate (following Keith Campbell) that 
there is one field for every one of the fundamental forces recognised in 
contemporary physics.  That would mean that there are four fields: 
gravitation, electromagnetism, weak and strong nuclear forces.   
But what then about temperature, charge or density, which obviously 
are properties?  If there is no temperature field or no density field, as I 
have just proposed, what account can we give of these properties then?  
What we need to show here in defence of field ontology is that there are 
ways how such properties can be traced back to field intensities.  Not 
only any subdivision of a field may be conceptualised as one trope, we 
may also conceptualise a certain combination of certain intensities of 
certain fields as one trope.  Obviously, we usually do not conceptualise 
electromagnetism as a property.  Usually we conceptualise temperature 
or density or anything like that as properties.  These Common Sense 
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tropes, I suggest, can be traced back to combinations of certain field 
strengths.  I shall indicate three ways how this might work for different 
properties.  First, some properties may be to be traced back to certain 
changes of field intensity.  Temperature, for example, is, according to 
kinetic-gas-theory, average kinetic energy of molecules; temperature is 
to be traced back to movement of molecules.  Molecules according to 
field ontology, are zones of high intensity of several fields.  Movement of 
molecules is therefore change of field strengths.  So, kinetic energy of 
molecules can be traced back to change of field strengths, hence tem-
perature can be traced back to combinations of field strengths.   
Secondly, some properties may be to be traced back to certain constant 
field intensities.  A property E may be at a position P if and only if at P 
field L has intensity a, field M has intensity b, and field N has intensity c. 
(L, M, and N may be the only fields there are, or there may be other 
fields besides L, M, and N.)  It would be intuitively reasonable if density 
were a property like that.  What the density at a certain position is, in 
other words how much matter there is at a position or what the intensity 
of matter is at a position, depends on certain field intensities at that po-
sition.10  
Thirdly, a property may be to be traced back to the integral of the inten-
sity of one or several fields in a certain region.  Mass might be an exam-
ple of such a property.  Mass is never mass at a certain point but always 
mass in a certain region, e.g. the region that is occupied by a stone.  The 
mass in a region R is to be traced back to the volume integral 
(dV=dxdydz) of the density in R.  Let us assume for the sake of illustra-
tion that there is a density field, whose intensity I call ρ.  The mass M in 
region R (e.g. the mass of a stone in region R) is:  
                                                           
10 Campbell (1990, p. 146) considers whether there is a matter field.  "Matter is not 
either fully present or completely absent; it is present with more or less intensity across 
all space-time."  If there is a matter field then the intensity of the matter field at a posi-
tion corresponds to the density at that position.   
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I think that these examples justify the hope that common-sense proper-
ties can be traced back to combinations of field strengths.   
I shall now confront field ontology with two central problems of ontol-
ogy: the problem of determinables and the problem of completeness of 
things. 
The problem of determinables 
There are classes of single properties which exhibit a strong unity.  A 
thing's having 1,1 g/cm3 and a thing's having 1,2 g/cm3 are closely re-
lated to each other.  They are both determinates of the same determin-
able, 'having 1,1 g/cm3' is a determinate property (or "singular" prop-
erty), 'having a density' is a determinable property (or "generic" prop-
erty).  Examples of other determinable properties are, e.g., temperature, 
mass, charge etc.  But what does the unity of determinates of the same 
determinable consist in?  Every ontology has to offer an account of de-
terminable properties, and I think field ontology does quite well here.  
Evan Fales (1990, p. 227) and David Armstrong (1978b, p. 116), both 
realists, list five (putative) facts which any adequate theory of deter-
minables must explain:   
(1) The determinates of a determinable all have something in common, 
they form a unity.  (E.g., all the determinate densities, 1,1 g/cm3, 1,2 
g/cm3, and so forth, belong in some sense together.)   
(2) At the same time they differ in that very respect (e.g. two different 
densities differ in density).  
(3) Determinates of one determinable exhibit a resemblance order.  
(E.g., densities are ordered so that we can refer to them as '1,1 g/cm3', 
'1,2 g/cm3', and so forth.) 
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(4) Determinates of one determinable form a set-of-incompatibles.  (E.g. 
no thing can wholly have at the same time the density 1,1 g/cm3 and the 
density 1,2 g/cm3.)   
(5) If and only if a thing has a determinable property it necessarily also 
has the determinable to which the determinate belongs.   
Field ontology offers an ontic structure which is parallel to the deter-
minable-determinate structure.  The connection between field and field 
strength corresponds to the connection between determinable and de-
terminate property.  For the sake of simplicity let us assume that density 
were a field.  We can then say that the field corresponds to the deter-
minable property and the field strength corresponds to the determinate 
property.  There is a density at a certain position if the density field is at 
that position.  Which density there is at that position depends on which 
intensity the field has at that position.  If there is a density field at all, 
then this field is at every position, and has a certain intensity there, be-
cause a field is extended over all of space.  In general terms, a determin-
able property G is at a position and at every position if the G-field, or the 
field or fields on which G is based, exists.  A certain determinate of G is 
at a certain position if the G-field or the fields on which G is based have 
certain intensities.  We can now explain the facts mentioned above as 
follows:  
Ad 1: The determinates of one determinable form a unity because they 
are intensities of the same field.  Densities have in common that they are 
different intensities of the density field.  What density a certain thing has 
depends on what intensity the relevant field has in the region the thing 
occupies.  All densities depend on the intensity of that field in the rele-
vant region.  If we talk about the density of a thing we talk about the in-
tensity of the density field rather than the intensity of some other field.  
When we talk about the density of some thing we always talk about the 
intensity of the same field.   
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Ad 2: Different determinates of a determinable differ in that they are 
different intensities of the same field.  If one thing has a density of 1 
g/cm3 and another thing has a density of 2 g/cm3, then these two tropes 
are subdivisions of the same field, which are similar but not exactly simi-
lar.   
Ad 3: The determinates of one and the same determinable exhibit a re-
semblance order because different positions of a field are more or less 
similar.  The intensities of a field form a continuous spectrum.  Assume 
D1, D2, and D3 are subdivisions of a field, say they are the density 
tropes of three things.  If D1 is more similar to D2 than to D3, and if D3 
is more similar to D2 than to D1, then the three tropes are ordered due 
to their resemblance in the order D1-D2-D3.   
Ad 4: Two different determinates of one and the same determinable are 
incompatible with one another because a field cannot have two different 
intensities at one and the same position.   
Ad 5: A thing cannot have a determinable property without having a 
determinate of it because a field cannot be in a region without having 
any intensity.  A field is extended over all of space, it is in every region, 
and if a field is in a region then it has an intensity in this region.   
The problem of completeness of things 
I claimed above that there are certain limitations as to what combination 
of properties a concrete entity can have.  The question then we are con-
fronted with is why not every combination of tropes can exist.  Why is it 
impossible that there is a thing which has all the properties the stone in 
front of me has except its density and which has no other density in-
stead?  If the stone in front of me is just a bundle of tropes – a density 
trope, a charge trope, a temperature trope etc. – why should it not be 
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possible to take one of those tropes away, as it is possible to remove a 
single twig from a bundle of brushwood?   
I think an ontology should entail that only certain combinations of 
properties exist, but this view is not widely acknowledged.  I mentioned 
already above that Campbell holds that there could be a single trope, 
which does not coexist with other tropes.  Erwin Tegtmeier (1992, p. 51) 
claims that already a single state of affairs, i.e. a thing's having a certain 
property, can exist without being combined with other states of affairs.  
That implies that there could be, for example, this stone's having 2 g/cm3 
without there being this stone's having a certain temperature and 
charge.  Armstrong holds the same view when he writes: "The individual 
must, I think, instantiate at least one monadic universal" (1997, p. 44), 
by which he implies that there could be an individual with just one 
property.   
One reason for holding that any combination of properties can exist is 
that this view is entailed by a combinatorial theory of possibility.  Ac-
cording to combinatorialism the world is a certain stock of entities 
which are combined in a certain way.  These entities could or can be 
combined in any way.  Every combination of the existing entities is pos-
sible.  If one holds combinatorialism and a trope ontology one will hold 
that any tropes can coexist (cf. Campbell 1990, pp. 93-95).  If one holds 
combinatorialism and that there are individuals and universals, as Arm-
strong does, then one will hold that an individual may have any proper-
ties.  It can have more or less properties, and it can have any combina-
tion of properties.  Armstrong defends combinatorialism and concludes 
that a thing can have any combination of properties.11  However, follow-
ing my modal intuitions I think that entities such as a single density or a 
thing having all the properties of the stone in front of me except density 
are absurd and cannot exist.  Therefore, I think that an ontology should 
                                                           
11 See Armstrong 1989, p. 118.  See also Armstrong's defence of his theory of possibility 
in his 1989, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility, Cambridge UP.  
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reflect this fact and explain why such entities are impossible.  It is only 
by an act of abstraction that we can think of an object as losing a deter-
minate property without being replaced by another determinate of the 
same determinable.  The properties of a thing are mutually dependent; 
only a complete object is capable of independent existence.  Roman In-
garden has pointed out that the dependence of a concrete object on its 
determinate properties is an ambiguous dependence.  An object that has 
the determinate property T1 requires exactly one property Ti from the 
set of those determinate properties {T1,..., Tn} that belong to a certain 
determinable, but it is not determined which property from that set it 
requires.12  Furthermore, there seems to be a certain set of determinables 
such that every thing, every subdivision of the material world, has ex-
actly one determinate belonging to it.  Every thing has a density, a 
charge etc.   
This is explained by field ontology as follows: In any region of the physi-
cal world there are the same fields present.  A field cannot be removed 
from the world, and there cannot be a hole in a field.  At every place 
there has to be exactly one intensity of each of the fields the physical 
world consists of.  This explains why there is – arguably – a certain set of 
determinables that is such that every object has to have exactly one de-
terminate of each of the ranges of determinates that belong to these de-
terminables.  Thus, it is not arbitrary how many tropes a physical object 
– a region of the material world – consists of.   
A trope ontology which assumes that middle-sized tropes, such as the 
density of a certain apple, are the basic entities of the material world 
could also claim that there is a set of determinables that is such that 
every object has to have exactly one determinate of each of the ranges of 
determinates that belong to these determinables, but it could not explain 
                                                           
12 See Ingarden 1965, p. 89.  Ingarden distinguishes various kinds of ontological de-
pendence.  The dependence of an object on its tropes he calls 'vieldeutige Seinsun-
selbständigkeit' (ambiguous existential non-self-sufficiency).   
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why, it would not make perspicuous what the uniform structure of the 
world consists in.  But shouldn't we expect that there is an explanation 
for the fact that there is the same structure of matter all over the uni-
verse?  Field ontology offers such an explanation.  It offers a simple 
model of the structure of the material world, which does justice to the 
uniform structure of the universe.  The world consists of fields, a field is 
extended over all of space, hence there are the same fields everywhere.   
Concluding remarks 
According to field ontology the ontic structure of the world does not 
exactly correlate to the structure of our conception of the world and to 
the structure of language.  Field ontology is, in Peter Strawson's term, a 
revisionary ontology.  It is an attempt to describe the ontic structure of 
the world.  It is not a description of our thoughts about the world, and it 
does not assume that the structures of our thinking about the world are 
exactly parallel to the ontic structures of the world.  According to more 
traditional ontologies we can read off from how we speak about and 
conceive of the world what the ontic structures of the world are.  If one 
starts from this assumption one is likely to end up with substance ontol-
ogy, which is parallel to the subject-predicate structure of our language.  
However, the fact that we can carve up the world in different, apparently 
equally legitimate ways should make us sceptical that our divisions of 
the world into particulars depict ontic structures of the world.  Field on-
tology is an attempt to do justice to this fact and to provide an ontologi-
cal description of the world, i.e. of the stuff of which we can conceive in 
the way we do.  I claim that a world which consists of fields looks like 
our world and is such that there can be portions of matter (subregions of 
the fields) of which we can conceive of as middle-sized things such as 
tables and eggs.  If physics would confirm an Aristotelian Common 
Sense ontology according to which there is a table here and a bed over 
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there one meter away from it and there is nothing in between, then we 
should accept this ontology.  But there is something in between, and 
physics has discovered structures of the world which are everywhere and 
which are everywhere the same, be it within this table, between this table 
and the bed, or between the sun and the moon.  Field ontology does jus-
tice to the fact that there is the same structure everywhere by claiming 
that the world consists of fields which are extended over all of space, and 
it does justice to the fact that the world is different in different regions 
by claiming that fields have different intensities in different regions.   
Is the world the totality of things?  This seems to be obviously true, but 
we should be careful how we spell this claim out.  It is not true, I have 
argued, that the material world is the totality of single things, substances, 
with a definite size each of which is somewhere in space and between 
which there is nothing.  I have suggested that we better describe the 
world ontologically not as the totality of things or particles but rather as 
consisting of fields which are extended over all of space.  A priori we 
may be inclined to think that the world consists of permanently existent 
particles, but we should be sceptical about this.  David Bohm, in his The 
Undivided Universe: An ontological interpretation of quantum theory 
(1993), takes it to be a result of modern physics that the concept of a 
particle is to be questioned:  
As it is well known the concept of a permanently existent particle is not consis-
tent with this theory [of relativity].  But rather it is the point event in space-time 
that is the basic concept.  In principle all structures have to be understood as 
forms in a generalised field which is a function of all the space-time points.  In 
this sort of theory a particle has to be treated either as a singularity in the field, 
or as a stable pulse of finite extent.  The field from each centre decreases with 
the distance, but it never goes to zero.  Therefore ultimately the fields of all the 
particles will merge to form a single structure that is an unbroken whole.  
(Bohm & Hiley 1993, The Undivided Universe, p. 352)   
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It seems that there are good reasons to believe that fields should have a 
future in ontology.13   
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